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Brazilian Steel Town and Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional
_
The first time I saw Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) was at 
the end of a long bus journey from Rio de Janeiro. As the bus exited 
Rio de Janeiro’s north station, it cut through interminable rows of 
favelas with the burnt-down National Ethnographic Museum in 
the background. Then, it wound through the beautiful Guanabara 
Bay – filled with plastic trash, industrial waste and broken fisher-
men’s boats – and continued along Presidente Dutra Road through 
semi-rural favelas and mega shopping centres – some of which 
functioned, while others were empty. Leaving behind Duque de 
Caixas, the bus crossed yet a different landscape, mixing smaller 
urban sprawls, bits of tropical forest and semi-derelict motels with 
exotic names such as Dallas, Samurai and Middle Age Castle or just 
the name of their owners like Tony, Cassio and Carlos. Climbing 
the winding roads of the Serra da Mantiqueira range, small mud 
houses, water silos and parabolic TV antennas were barely visible 
through the tropical vegetation of the valley, and its residents occa-
sionally appeared by the road selling bananas, papayas or coconuts. 
Finally, as the bus descended the mountain, the monstrous body of 
the Usina Presidente Vargas (President Vargas Plant – UPV) sat in 
the Paraíba Valley like a giant animal. With its smoky whirlpools, 
coloured fumes and coils of vapour, the plant seemed like an organic 
extension of the surrounding forest. Plants, fruit trees, tropical flow-
ers, iron ore, pipes, rusting machinery and bright pools of chemicals 
formed a half-organic, half-industrial landscape. Wild capybaras 
and iguanas ran through the rubbish and chemical waste fermented 
on the banks of the Paraíba. Loud cricket chirps reverberated across 
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electricity wires, stopping every time the siren of the furnace went 
off.
Such interpenetration between industry and nature reminded 
me of the modernist ‘Manifesto da Poesia Pau-Brasil’ (Manifesto 
of Brazilwood poetry) by Oswald de Andrade (1924). Influenced 
by the European avant-garde, Andrade pictured the early Brazilian 
working class through an essentialising mixture of indigenous iden-
tity and primitive communism. Brazilian modernism reflected the 
aristocratic fantasies of the cosmopolitan coffee elite (see Schwarz 
1992), as it did Getúlio Vargas’s dream to industrialise Brazil by 
building the huge CSN steel complex on the site of a half-dilapidated 
coffee fazenda (farm). Vargas’s modernist fantasy projected onto 
Volta Redonda transpires from the speech he made when visiting 
the UPV in 1943:
This industrial town will be the mark of our civilization, a monument to the 
potential of our people; the evidence that will disperse any doubt or anxiety 
about our future and will establish a new way of living and a new mentality 
. . . The country that was semi-colonial agrarian, importer of manufactured 
goods and exporter of raw materials will be able to assume the responsibility 
of an autonomous industrial life. (Morel 1989: 48)
Figure 0.1. Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (© Massimiliano Mollona).
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Despite Vargas’s hope that CSN would modernise the nation by 
making it industrially self-sufficient, the company remained under 
regionalists powers, was managed by an industrial bourgeoisie 
moulded in the authoritarian style of the rural elite and was con-
sidered as much a rural fazenda as an industrial business until it 
was privatised in 1992. Thus, the steel town’s working class emerged 
from the entanglement of the forward-looking dream of industrial 
modernity and the backwards vision of rural elites, violent coronels 
and colonial and neocolonial powers. Indeed, to fully appreciate the 
lopsided history of Brazilian development, travellers ought to con-
tinue the bus ride behind Volta Redonda and stop at the majestic 
fazendas of the Fluminense region – in Vassouras, Barra de Piraí and 
Valença – which during the ‘second slavery’ were among the world’s 
biggest coffee plantations, with hundreds of slaves and labourers, 
and today are run as tourist attractions by the same aristocratic fami-
lies that once made up the elites of the Brazilian empire.
Brazilian Steel Town is solidly rooted in Marx’s radical tradition 
of political economy, especially the critique of capitalist value, com-
bined with an anthropological attunement to the cultural and phe-
nomenological forms through which struggles between capital and 
labour take place in the everyday. I use steelmaking as a metaphor to 
explore the ‘magmatic’ relationships between capital and labour; the 
polymorph metamorphoses of value on the shop floor; the blurred 
boundaries between the factory, the township and the surrounding 
nature; and the ghostly existence of the subcontractors, cleaners and 
maintenance workers who move at the margins of the UPV. Although 
this book is situated in the disciplinary world of Western academia, 
its core concepts and issues originate from Brazilian sociology, 
anthropology and cultural theory. This book aims to offer a vision of 
 twenty-first-century working-class life in Brazil, by threading together 
the micro- and the macro-political, the affective and the material and 
the ethnographic and the historical perspectives. Moreover, Brazilian 
Steel Town combines anthropology and political economy following 
a double movement – one of economicisation of politics and another 
of politicisation of the economy – in the tradition of Karl Marx, Peter 
Kropotkin and Rosa Luxemburg, who considered the economy as 
a ‘total fact’ (i.e. entangled in social relations); historically (paying 
attention to diverse histories and temporalities) and comparatively 
(i.e. in relation to the livelihood of often marginal ‘others’).
The political economy approach in anthropology (Roseberry 
1988; Smith 1999; Wolf 1982) goes beyond ‘mere’ social analysis and 
sketches possible future scenarios of human-centred economies and 
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even of utopian socialism (Clastres 1974; Graeber 2004). Inspired by 
Marx’s critique of political economy, Brazilian Steel Town is conceived 
as an ethnographic critique of capitalist economic categories. Indeed, 
there is a mounting movement calling for the discipline of economics 
‘to get real’, leave behind its abstract and disingenuous assumptions 
about human behaviour and engage in long-term, grounded, critical 
and human-centred political economy by looking at those value 
forms that transcend the commodity form – concretely negating the 
abstractions of capitalism – and contribute to the reproduction of 
life.
In other terms, there is increasing awareness that the ‘realism of 
capitalism’ is a political construct and that economic theory is itself 
a form of social reproduction. Inspired by Theodor Adorno’s nega-
tive dialectics, the political theorist Frederick Harry Pitts (2018: 110) 
argues that a critical approach to capitalism rests ‘in the refusal to 
accept at face value the economic objective forms taken by congealed 
social relations in capitalist society, whilst at once working within 
this face value as long as it is the value refused’. Taking a feminist and 
Althusserian perspective, J. K. Gibson-Graham (1996) argue ortho-
dox economics is an ideological discourse revolving around ‘capi-
talocentric’ and normalising – patriarchal, xenophobic, homophobic 
and racist – assumptions. Using a queering, discoursive and ethno-
graphic methodology, they map the ‘diverse economies’ – including 
co- operativism, informal labour and self-entrepreneurship – that 
coexist in the capitalist mode of production.
Similarly, the anthropologist Douglas Holmes (2013) describes 
economics as a top-down process of discoursive ‘framing’ of reality 
by powerful global financial institutions (central banks and the IMF), 
which become a normalising social force that shapes the expecta-
tion of the public-at-large and adjusts its behaviours. His Economy 
of Words describes ethnographically the ‘perfomative apparatus’ of 
technical reports, forecasting models, public statements and pub-
lished policy deliberations, through which bankers and economists 
construct linguistically and communicatively ‘economic truths’. 
Likewise, Mitchell Abolafia (2004) looks at the micro-politics of the 
US Federal Reserve by analysing its members’ ‘framing moves’ – that 
is, the efforts to influence the interpretation of information – within 
the competing ideologies of Keynesianism and monetarism.
The fact that corporations increasingly rely on anthropologists for 
their latest market trend forecasts and technological innovation, or 
that global financial institutions manage expanded anthropological 
networks to capture cultural content for their economic models, 
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(Holmes 2016) shows anthropology’s potential to create new vocab-
ularies, practices and models of political economy grounded in 
people’s everyday livelihood and accessed through the anthropolog-
ical practice of fieldwork, itself as a potential form of revolutionary 
praxis of research intervention. Anthropology can both politicise the 
 economy – by showing its situated, contested and rhetorical per-
formative processes – and economicise politics, highlighting how 
ideologies and structures of imagination are grounded in the materi-
ality of everyday life. Politics and economics cannot be separated, as 
they are two combined and uneven movements inherent in human 
development. Anthropology captures the human roots of capitalism 
intended as a process of cultural construction of alterity that sus-
tains the imperialist project of occupation and destruction of life and 
 annihilation of ‘the other’.
CSN and Brazilian Extractivism
In this book, I discuss how Vargas’s modernist dream – based on 
the entanglement between industrial modernity and agrarian back-
wardness and on the alliance between the presidente and the Brazilian 
‘people’ – re-emerged under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s 
neo-extractivist regime, and how this impacted a section of the 
Brazilian working class. I describe neo-extractivism as a particular 
form of capitalism, combining extensive commodity extraction, finance 
and large-scale state infrastructures, and associated with particular 
patterns of social relations of production, in the Marxist sense. I con-
tend there has been a global shift in predominance from exploitation 
through wages of various forms to extraction through rents of various 
forms (Gago and Mezzadra 2017; Standing 2016). In this book, I look 
at how such a rentierist mode of production has materialised in Volta 
Redonda, one of Latin America’s most important manufacturing and 
financial hubs.
Although my ethnography focuses on steelmaking, CSN’s main 
source of income comes from iron ore extraction and logistics, so the 
firm is an engine of Brazil’s neo-extractivist regime. Unlike other Latin 
American models of neo-extractivism, which are ultimately controlled 
by foreign capital (Veltmeyer and Petra 2014), the Brazilian model 
revolves around the alliance between the ‘state investor’, corporatist 
trade unions and the corporate sector. Using intensive commodity 
extraction to feed mass programmes of poverty reduction, the ruling 
Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party – PT) emancipated urban 
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and rural masses while keeping alive the power of the landed and 
financial elites. I test this hypothesis by looking at the articulation of 
social relations of production on the ground – in the UPV and the city 
of Volta Redonda. I argue neo-extractivism in Volta Redonda takes a 
conglomerate form, encompassing global logistics, mining, steelmak-
ing and urban land speculation. I also argue the ‘internalisation of 
imperialism’ (Oliveira 2005) that followed the transformation of the 
state from developer to financial investor (Musacchio and Lazzarini 
2014) generated a new exploitative labour regime in CSN based on 
extreme deskilling, precarisation and the flexibilisation of the re- 
internalised workforce.
Funded in 1946 by Vargas, Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
(National Steel Company) was the first independent national indus-
trial complex in Brazil and the first modern experiment of a mixed 
economic enterprise. In the first half of the twentieth century, the 
state radically expanded its role as ‘entrepreneur’ in the electricity, 
hydroelectric, logistics, banking, insurance and social welfare and 
pension sectors through mixed economic corporations called state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) also known as autarquias (autarchies). 
These were under private law but relied on an administrative public 
infrastructure that allowed them to retain a public interest agenda. 
Autarquias were de facto decentralised public services providers – 
of credit, social welfare and logistical management – aimed at de- 
bureaucratising the state. They were autonomous juridical subjects 
with administrative and financial autonomy but under state control 
(Venancio Filho 1968: 36).
Akin to the modern-day public-private partnership, they consti-
tuted a radical departure from the existing Brazilian civic code, which 
had only three forms of public juridical person: the union, the state 
and the municipality. Like other SOEs that mixed public infrastruc-
tures and private management and finance, CSN embodied Vargas’s 
‘organicist’ view of the relationship between the state and the market, 
which defeated both classical liberal and Marxist conceptions. For 
Alfred Stepan (1988: 30), this mixture of planned economy, akin to 
communism, and capitalism is typical of Latin America:
Policy makers in Latin American commonly commit themselves to an inter-
mediate statist model that is neither communist nor capitalist by replacing 
private initiative with overall public regulation in economic life, and at the 
same time, retaining the marketplace as a basic mechanism for distributing 
goods and service. They retain a system that is heavily dependent on entre-
preneurial initiative and market flows, whilst at the same time, undermining 
both.
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Moreover, CSN embodied Vargas’s regime of trabalhismo (work-
erism) based on a special relationship between the state and the 
working class achieved by linking citizenship rights to labour rights. 
In 1943, Vargas’s Ministry of Labour and Employment created the 
Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (Consolidation of Labour Laws  – 
CLT), which continues to be one of the most comprehensive labour 
legislations in the world.1 Among other things, the CLT establishes 
the workers’ right to minimum wage, vacation, leave, professional 
training, housing, pensions and child benefits and regulates trade 
union affiliation, training and education. The sociologist Angela de 
Castro Gomes (1987) describes Vargas’s workerist regime as ‘occupa-
tional welfare’, in which the working class achieved labour and civic 
rights within a framework of moral and legal dependency on the 
state. Moreover, she draws a stark contrast between the quiescence of 
the early Brazilian working class and how the early English working 
class emerged as a self-conscious political agent at the end of a long 
struggle led by different social strata in opposition to the state. The 
idea that the CLT produced a ‘passive social revolution’ is by shared 
by several Brazilian sociologists.2
Figure 0.2. Getúlio Vargas in CSN. Published with permission from the 
Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano (Institute for Urban Research and 
Planning).
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Elsewhere, I argue this contrast between the early British 
and Brazilian working classes is based on an idealised version of 
 working-class struggles in England3 and a restricted reading of 
Brazilian working-class history (Mollona 2014). The quiescence of the 
working class had more to do with the fact that Brazil under Vargas 
was not an industrial democracy: it was still under the authoritarian 
rule of rural leaders, generals and the old coffee elite (French 2004). 
Moreover, the formal working class was, and continues to be, a small 
section of the working population mainly employed in the informal 
economy (Braga 2016; Singer 2018a). Unlike nineteenth- century cap-
italist England, the Brazilian labour regime mixed slavery and wage 
labour – a vast sub-proletariat and a small aristocracy of labour – 
so struggles for civic emancipation and struggles for economic 
 redistribution went hand in hand.
In a country where 80 per cent of the population was below 
the poverty line, the ‘regulated citizenship’ promised by the CLT 
was ‘utopian’ (Cardoso 2010: 775). But such utopia could only be 
realised with the inclusion of rural citizens – 70 per cent of Brazil’s 
 population – two-thirds of whom worked informally or under a 
regime of semi-slavery. However, because of resistance from rural 
elites, the new labour legislation excluded foreign, agricultural, infor-
mal and unregistered workers. Thus, by making the urban industrial 
worker the exclusive recipient of citizens’ rights based on the carteira 
de trabalho (work permit, on which occupational status was formally 
registered), the CLT de facto reproduced the previous regime of 
slavery for black, rural and informal workers. Indeed, without birth 
registration on their civic registers, rural workers were automatically 
excluded not only from formal employment but also from education, 
health benefits and the rights to vote and to property (Holston 2007).
For the sociologist Francisco de Oliveira (2005), Vargas’s work-
erist legislation was meant to split the workforce between a small 
core of formal worker and a vast urban and rural lumpen, to disem-
power rather empower the working class and to decrease industrial 
wages. Indeed, since its establishment of the CLT, the minimum 
salary was constantly kept below subsistence levels. In other words, 
the pro- labour legislation of the Estado Novo (New State) forcedly 
implemented a capitalist labour market in Brazil not to develop a 
modern industry but rather to reproduce the previous system of slav-
ery within the new industrial system (Singer 2018a: 21). Indeed, the 
immense scale of informal labour in contemporary Brazil continues 
to testify its peripheral condition vis-à-vis economies of the Global 
North and the marginality of its population, which, fluctuating in 
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and out of employment, continues to lack of political, labour and 
welfare rights (Braga 2016: 60).
CSN was the crown jewel in Vargas’s policy of state-led industrial-
isation in the steel, oil, mining and infrastructure industries together 
with other SOEs such as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (now Vale) 
funded in 1942, and Petrobras funded in 1952. These SOEs were run 
by highly educated engineers and military elite4 – trained in US-style 
military academies – and supported by the landowning class. This 
technocratic bureaucracy had penetrated deeply in the Brazilian 
economy and formed a separate, centrifugal force within the state 
(see Martins 1974), which Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) describes 
as ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’. One of these semi-independent 
‘empires’ (Trebat 1983) was what is now the Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development – BNDES), set up in 1952 after the joint 
US-Brazil Commission called for the creation of a credit institution 
to finance the expansion of national infrastructure. In its early years, 
the BNDES focused on railroad modernisation and power generation 
and transmission. In the late 1950s, the bank began supporting the 
expansion of the steel and electricity sectors. From 1958 to 1969, half 
its funds went to the steel sector, so it became known as the National 
Steel Bank. In the 1960s and 1970s, the bank operated as a giant 
holding company for the steel industry.
Moreover, through its own investment bank, BNDESPAR, the 
BNDES had a double role of lender and controller of many national 
industries. Typically, the bank would start by financing minority por-
tions of a company and later, through equity injections or convert-
ible debt, become a majority shareholder. Through the BNDESPAR, 
the state become a minority – and, in several instances, majority – 
shareholder in several strategic industries, thus morphing from 
‘entrepreneur’ to ‘investor’ (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014). Since 
its reorganisation in the 1980s, the BNDES had moved from giving 
developmental support to public firms to implementing infrastruc-
tural projects, especially in the financial sector (Montero 1998: 34). 
Starting from this period, the bank functioned as the ‘operational 
agent of the state’ – but with autonomous budget and organisational 
structure – and as the main force behind the ‘statitization of the 
Brazilian economy’ (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014: 89).
Through the BNDES, the state expanded control over power-
ful national conglomerates, such as the construction company 
Odebrecht,5 and renationalised Petrobras and Oi (previously Brasil 
Telecom). During the PT administration, Petrobras became the 
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fourth largest oil company in the world. Aldo Musacchio and Sergio 
Lazzarini (2014: 99) describe the Brazilian state as a ‘leviathan’. In 
2009, there were forty-seven public companies in which the federal 
government had majority shares, with assets worth $625 billion, and 
five of these were state-owned holding enterprises that controlled 
sixty-eight subsidiaries. As a result, ‘the federal government in Brazil 
had almost three times the assets under management (AUM) of the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway, the world’s largest sovereign 
wealth fund, with an AUM close to $500 million in 2009’. But, pace 
Musacchio and Lazzarini, such a model of state capitalism has noth-
ing to do with socialism or with public control over private business. 
Instead, it reflects the interests of a narrow industrial and banking 
elite and of foreign capital that have occupied the state since the 
República Velha (Old Republic).
The role of industrial entrepreneur of the Brazilian state started 
with João VI (the Portuguese prince and future king of Brazil) who 
was keen to break Brazil’s dependent development on coffee, sugar 
and rubber monocultures and commodity exports controlled by 
European capital. João supported the steel, iron and silk sectors 
through exemption duties on imports of raw material, high taxes on 
commodity exports (40 per cent) and direct subsidies. In the Código 
Brasiliense (Brazilian code) of 1811, João described these measures 
as ‘free gifts to the capitalists from the state’. His vision of autarkic 
and independent national industry was vindicated by the crisis of 
the coffee economy in the 1870s, and the financial collapse of the 
landowning class sparked by the end of slavery.
By the mid-nineteenth century, there were more than sixty-four 
national industries in Brazil and a powerful industrial association 
founded as early as 1880. In the 1900s, the state withdrew support 
to coffee growers and increased support to the steel and mining 
 industries – half of which were controlled by fazendeiros (Luz 1978: 
48; Villela and Suzigan 1973: 124). It was under Getúlio Vargas’s Estado 
Novo that the national industry boomed, associated with import sub-
stitution policies, so that Brazil could follow in the development path 
of ‘the developed nations’ and become economically self-sufficient. 
Vargas’s industrialisation plan could not have succeeded without 
support from the United States and the landed elites, who made 
sure industrialisation would not turn into a fully-fledged bourgeois 
revolution (Fernandes 1975). Thus, the model of state-led industri-
alisation under the control of agrarian elites established in the early 
empire and reproduced under Vargas’s Estado Novo turned out to be 
the blueprint of Brazilian development.
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The turning point for the current model of state capitalism was 
the radical programme of privatisation of the early 1990s, includ-
ing of CSN, which I describe extensively in chapter 5. In the pri-
vatisation process, the BNDES acted once again as the operational 
agent of the state and through the BNDESPAR purchased minority 
stakes in the privatised firms thus, putting the state in control, often 
through a system of expanded and invisible web of pyramidal and 
cross- participations, of several strategic steel firms (Musacchio and 
Lazzarini 2014). The privatisation of CSN in 1992 turned it from being 
a traditional steelmaker into a conglomerate operating in the finance, 
logistics and mining sectors. Paradoxically, it was with privatisation 
that the state gained control indirectly – that is, by controlling the 
Grupo Vicunha (Vicunha Group) of CSN – and turned into one of its 
extractivist arms.
The privatisation of CSN transformed it into a typical ‘national 
champion’ with a conglomerate and internationalised structure, ver-
tically integrated and diversified into logistics, extraction, finance 
and steelmaking. Characteristic also of China, India and South Korea, 
conglomerates are considered the ‘developmentalist’ alternative to 
the flexible, flat, dispersed and highly financialised capitalism in the 
north (Goldstein and Ross Schneider 2004; Amman and Nixson 1999) 
Conglomerates are said to perform particularly well during economic 
crises because they provide internal credit and mechanisms of inter-
nal transfer of the workforce instead of lay-offs. On the other hand, 
Latin American conglomerates are said to be hierarchic and ‘despotic’ 
(Schneider and Soskice 2009). Indeed, the hyper-centralised and ver-
ticalised post-privatisation structure of CSN reflected the despotic 
regime of the new owner, a magnate whose main business is the 
textile industry.
Moreover, privatisation led to what Oliveira (2005) calls ‘the 
internalisation of imperialism’ (via the BNDES) leading to the meta-
morphosis of national debt dependency on foreign companies into 
working-class debt dependency on the state. As for other contexts 
(from post-communist Poland to Chile in the 1980s), privatisation in 
Brazil was branded as a form of ‘people’s capitalism’. The minister of 
finance of the time, the famous world dependency theorist Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, considered privatisation a tool of ‘emancipation 
of the periphery’. I show in chapter 5 that privatisation in fact used 
mostly working-class savings – in the form of pension funds and the 
Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (Worker Support Fund  – FAT) – to 
reproduce existing monopolistic powers while fending off foreign 
investors. Thus, the privatisation of CSN not only broke the workers’ 
"BRAZILIAN STEEL TOWN: Machines, Land, Money and Commoning in the Making of the Working Class" by 
 Massimiliano Mollona. https://berghahnbooks.com/title/MollonaBrazilian
12   |   Brazilian Steel Town
movement in Volta Redonda and nationally (Graciolli 2007). It also 
used working-class money to subsidise the banking and industrial 
bourgeoisie.
The FAT was created with the 1988 Constitution of the Federative 
Republic of Brazil, which earmarked 60 per cent of it for unemploy-
ment insurance and the remaining 40 per cent for the BNDES to finance 
development programmes. By 2006, the FAT was responsible for 67 
per cent of the disbursements of the BNDES, amounting to more than 
$100 billion in 2010 (Zibechi 2014: 47). Pension funds were created in 
1977 by the military regime. In 2001, President F. H. Cardoso passed 
Law 108, allowing union members to manage the funds. Cardoso 
believed workers’ participation in the management of pension funds 
would boost the economy and open it up to popular forces. But it was 
under the Lula administration that the privatised system of pension 
funds and the FAT came to dominate the Brazilian economy.
The popularisation of financial capitalism via pension funds was 
already part of Lula’s first electoral manifesto. From 2003 onwards, 
unionists, especially those associated with the confederation Central 
Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central – CUT), created 
their own pension funds, began to frequent business milieus and 
even joined the board of the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (São Paulo 
Stock Exchange). Raúl Zibechi (2014: 41) estimates the 2010 pension 
fund assets in Brazil reached $300 billion, 16 per cent of Brazil’s GDP, 
becoming the largest institutional investor of the country. In 2010, 
the PT controlled fifteen pension funds, including Previ, Petros and 
Funcef, which are among the world’s biggest. For instance, Previ is 
ranked twenty-fifth in the world, controls seventy Brazilian compa-
nies and owns shares, some of which are majority, in Vale, Embraer, 
Petrobras, Usiminas, and Gerdau.
In Lula’s second administration (2006–2010), the link between the 
government, the banking elite and the industrial elite and the BNDES 
strengthened further so that ‘financial accumulation now occurred 
mainly in the state realm’. The state-led financialisation of the econ-
omy turned ex-workers – ‘the hard core of the PT’ (Oliveira 2006: 
23, 25) – into pension fund operators and powerful public managers 
in control of private conglomerates such as Vale. These ex-labour- 
activists-turned-public-fund-managers constituted a new financial 
class (Zibechi 2014: 147; Boito 2007: 117). The ruling PT also strength-
ened further the influence of the BNDES, which today is the biggest 
development bank in the world with investments representing 7 per 
cent of Brazil’s GDP. The BNDES and pension funds will account for 
40 per cent of Brazil’s GDP by 2024.
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Moreover, Lula consolidated his model of ‘developmentalist 
extractivism’ based on, according to Maristella Svampa, ‘large-
scale enterprises, a focus on exportation and a tendency for mono- 
production or monoculture. Its emblematic figures are strip mining, 
the expansion of the petroleum and energy frontiers and the gener-
alization of the agribusiness model (soy and biofuel)’. According to 
Svampa, neo-extractivism is in need of continuous expansion and 
hence is tied to citizen consumption, overdevelopment of state infra-
structures and ‘an imperialist mode of living’ (2017: 66, 67). In 2008, 
Lula launched the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (Growth 
Acceleration Programme – PAC) a four-year investment programme 
with a budget of R$291 billion (23 per cent of the GDP) concentrated 
in the infrastructure and energy sectors. The second phase (PAC 2) 
included the construction of fifty-four hydroelectric plants, with 
dams to be built mostly in the Amazon basin.
CSN has a central role in the neo-extractivist developmentalism 
of the Brazilian state. The firm controls important mines, forests and 
logistical nodes, such as the Port of Sepetiba, which provides access 
to the global maritime trade. Besides, CSN owns the operator of the 
Transnordestina railway – a 1,700-kilometer line connecting the state 
of Rio de Janeiro with the northern states of Ceará, Maranhão and 
Piauí. Once completed, the line will connect all the major ports and oil 
refineries in the states of Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo and carry 
commodities such as soy, corn, iron ore and gypsum from the Piauí 
north to the Port of Pecém and east to the Port of Suape, and from 
there be shipped to China, Brazil’s main export market.
The Transnordestina railway displaced millions of small farmers 
in Brazil’s notoriously poor Região Nordeste (Northeast Region). 
But at its launch in 2006, Lula described the R$11.2 billion ($3.53 
billion) Transnordestina project as a miraculous tool of development 
for the rural masses. Although CSN agreed to inject R$3.6 billion in 
the project in 2016, the railway is largely funded with BNDES and 
federal money. In turn, CSN greatly benefits from the infrastructural 
expansion of the state. For instance, PACs boost the internal market 
for steel, which in 2010 constituted 80 per cent of the steel revenues 
of the company. Moreover, the government’s funding of the mining 
industry through the BNDES and the softening of environmental 
restrictions6 boosted CSN mining revenue, which in 2010 was R$1.2 
billion, the highest income generated in the group.
Linked to this extractivist model is the internationalisation of 
Brazilian companies, which Virginia Fontes and Ana Garcia (2014) 
describe as ‘imperial capitalism’. As for other emerging economies, 
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the internationalisation of Brazilian capital and the dominance of 
Brazilian firms were boosted by the economic crisis of 2007–2008. 
According to the Boston Consulting Group (Bhattacharya et al. 2013), 
Brazil has thirteen companies in the ‘global challengers’ list, behind 
only China and India, in addition to its already established global con-
glomerates such as Vale and Petrobras (Fontes and Garcia 2014: 209). 
The main regional focus of the ‘sub-imperialist expansion’ (Zibechi 
2014) of Brazilian conglomerates in the oil, gas, mining, hydroelec-
tric, ethanol, cellulose and construction sectors are the northern and 
Amazonian regions and Latin America, where corporate expansion 
has taken the form of brutal ‘expulsion’, land grabbing and para-
military violence (Sassen 2014: 99). Indeed, Lula’s renationalisation 
of Petrobras was largely driven by his intention to turn the energy 
complex into a global ethanol producer and protect this strategic 
sector from competition from the United States.
In this book, I discuss how the workers of Volta Redonda negoti-
ate the social and economic regimes associated with the extractivist 
state. I argue there is a structural coupling between Brazil’s depen-
dency in the global economy, in the car, steel and IT sectors, and 
the strategies of accumulation by dispossession by CSN based on 
rent seeking, commodity export (mainly iron ore) and a precarised 
working regime. In 2008, the metalworkers of Volta Redonda thought 
of themselves as capitalists. But during my fieldwork, they strug-
gled with unemployment, debts and declining purchasing power.7 
With a powerless Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos do Sul Fluminense 
(Metalworkers’ Union of Sul Fluminense – SMSF), conservative evan-
gelical organisations and loose business-citizens’ platforms increas-
ingly took up the struggles of the metalúrgicos (metalworkers). Seeing 
their bourgeois lifestyle waning, the metalworkers were resentful 
towards the PT and the upwardly mobile poor with precarious jobs 
in retail, IT and service sectors or in the tertiarised manufacturing 
industry. They would often blame these ‘new rich’ for ‘milking the 
system’ either by having jobs on the side while also receiving benefits 
from Bolsa Família (Family Allowance) or by applying to the Minha 
Casa, Minha Vida (My House, My Life – MCMV) subsidised housing 
programme without qualifying for it. Given the racially segmented 
occupational structure of Volta Redonda – the black community is 
employed in precarious sectors or as subcontractors in the manufac-
turing  industry – these off-the-cuff remarks about the new rich were 
intrinsically racist.
Paradoxically, right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro had a big fol-
lowing among the evangelical community in Volta Redonda, rooted 
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predominantly in poor and black bairros (neighbourhoods). But his 
racists and homophobic remarks during the 2018 electoral campaign 
appealed mainly to the lower middle class of Volta Redonda – 
 entrepreneurs, commercial families and the working class disillu-
sioned with the PT – which voted for him (Mollona 2018b). Another 
section of the working class – informal and tertiarised workers in the 
service and building industries – faced a similarly harsh employer: the 
municipality of Volta Redonda and illegal contractors, who exploited 
their labour in the desperate attempt to survive in the shadow of 
the UPV. A third section of the working class – tertiarised industrial 
workers, IT workers and autoworkers –experienced first-hand the 
harsh tertiarisation regime by big national and foreign corporations. 
Their struggles against labour deregulation took the form of regional 
alliances (characterised by a mixture of business pragmatism) and 
social justice activism, strengthened by the legal principle of subsid-
iary responsibility.
Moreover, I show the trade union’s factory-based struggles, the land 
activism of civic coalitions and the legal and the business activism of 
the new working class were different strategies of labour struggle 
happening at different state levels and reflecting historically and geo-
graphically diverse trajectories of capitalist development. These dif-
ferent working-class constituencies – the metalúrgicos, autoworkers, 
pensioners, cleaners, builders and other disenfranchised  workers – 
were part of the same undifferentiated and magmatic centre (‘Class 
C’) that brought together conservative and progressive forces thus, 
complicating the traditional opposition between labour and capital, 
and creating a fragile political equilibrium that collapsed with the 
economic crisis.
Lulismo
At the beginning of my fieldwork in October 2008, I was reading The 
Economist at Heathrow Airport waiting to embark on the flight to Rio 
de Janeiro. The magazine’s front cover showed the Cristo Redentor 
statue shooting into the sky like a rocket and the title ‘Brazil is taking 
off’. A few months later, the news of the momentous financial crisis in 
the United States reached Brazil as some exotic epidemic the country 
seemed immunised from. Amidst global recession, the country was 
growing at a rate of 8 per cent, and the real currency was getting 
stronger, thus allowing millions of Brazilians to buy foreign white 
goods, travel worldwide and embrace the middle-class way of life. 
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In the G20 meeting in Washington, DC, that year, President Lula da 
Silva (2008) addressed the finance ministers and central governors 
from the Global North with a damning assessment:
The crisis started in advanced economies. It is a result of the blind belief in 
the market’s self-regulation capacity and, by and large, of the lack of control 
of the activities of financial agents. For many years, speculators have made 
excessive profits, investing money they did not have in miraculous business. 
We are all paying for this adventure. This system, just like a card castle, 
collapsed and killed the dogmatic faith in the principle of no government 
intervention in economies.
Indeed, because of state regulation, Brazilian pension funds had 
been relatively untouched by the financial crisis. In addition, the Lula 
government had instituted a 2 per cent tax on capital inflows and 
passed a law that earmarked 20 per cent of pension funds towards 
productive investments, especially infrastructure. Brazil had just won 
the bid to host the World Cup in 2014, and photos of Lula holding the 
trophy went viral on social media and in national newspapers. No 
doubt about it – I had arrived in Brazil at the apex of lulismo (Lulism).
Indeed, the working-class experience in Volta Redonda cannot be 
reduced to the political economy of neo-extractivism. The charismatic 
personality of ex-president Lula had a huge impact on  working-class 
politics, and not a single day passed during my fieldwork without 
Lula being mentioned by friends and acquaintances. André Singer 
(2012: 14) describes lulismo as the encounter between a style of 
government (i.e. redistributive populism) and a class formation, 
the sub-proletariat. Lula’s redistributive populism empowered the 
sub-proletariat and the rural masses – the historical social formation 
that emerged from slavery – while maintaining the power of the 
industrial and financial elites. Economically, it combined high inter-
est rates, overvalued currency, programmes of poverty reduction and 
wage increases for the lowest section of the working class.
The PT’s ascent to power and its consolidation up until 2013 was 
largely the result of two political shifts: (1) the overwhelming sup-
port by the poor communities in the rural Northeast and (2) the 
transformation of the top echelons of the trade union into a new 
financial class. The lumpen’s overwhelming support reversed Brazil’s 
historical trend. In the 1990s, the poorest section of society supported 
the neo-liberal policies of Cardoso and voted against Lula – being 
suspicious of the Left, particularly its disruptive strikes and liberal 
values, for instance, on abortion or women’s and blacks’ rights. Then, 
it was students, public functionaries and the educated middle class 
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in the South that supported Lula. In the 2006 elections, the situation 
had reversed – 55 per cent of the super-poor and those up to two min-
imum wages had voted for Lula, whereas 65 per cent of the richest 
section of the population voted for the centre-right candidate of the 
Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party – PSDB). Relying on the ‘extremes’ – the extremely poor and the 
financial elite – lulismo was intrinsically precarious (Braga and Purdy 
2018; Singer 2012) and even ‘schizophrenic’ (Braga 2016).
Oliveira (2005) describes the incorporation of the financial elite 
within the state controlled by a working-class party ‘hegemony in 
reverse’. He argues such a contradictory power bloc reflects Brazil’s 
peripheral capitalism – a mixture of technologically advanced and 
precarised IT sector, outdated manufacturing industry and vast 
informal economy and precarious labour – which he describes as 
a ‘duckbilled platypus’ (half-mammal, half-bird). During his two 
administrations, Lula massively increased the minimum wage;8 set 
up Bolsa Família, a radical programme of poverty reduction; democ-
ratised credit and popularised and ‘moralised’ stock market capital-
ism (Jardim 2009) developing financial and housing markets for the 
poor (Ricci 2010: 35–42).
Because of these anti-poverty and pro-labour economic policies, 
the population below the poverty line decreased from 28.5 per cent in 
2003 to 16 per cent in 2008 (Fishlow 2011: 105), and the Brazilian middle 
class, or Class C, boomed.9 In a 2012 interview with the Financial 
Times, Dilma Rousseff claimed: ‘This, I think, is a very important 
gain for Brazil – that is, to transform itself into a  middle-class pop-
ulation. We want this; we want a middle-class Brazil’ (Leahy 2012). 
Indeed, since Brazil’s PT took power in 2003, more than forty million 
Brazilians joined the middle class, including, in income terms, the 
working class.10 As of 2015, Class C Brazilians accounted for 53 per 
cent of the country’s population (Pearson 2015).
Yet, for Marcio Pochmann, the notion of ‘Class C is a myth’ (2012: 
25). His statistical analysis shows the Brazilian ‘middle class’ barely 
makes it above the poverty threshold. Its occupations are as precar-
ious as those of informal workers and the poor newly entered in the 
job market. For Pochmann, the Brazilian Class C is the increasingly 
marginalised and precarised working class – employed in call cen-
tres, fast food restaurants, banks or supermarkets with flexible and 
precarious contracts – which expanded the most during the second 
Lula administration. The precarisation of the middle-class is a global 
phenomenon (Banerjee and Duflo 2008), but according to Marcello 
Neri (2011), there is a special porosity between the lower middle class 
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and the working class in Brazil. For instance, a 10 per cent increase 
in retail prices in 2013 hit the working class hard. Most working-class 
families struggled to pay for mortgages and for food and basic ser-
vices. But the middle class was hit even more violently by the rise 
in the costs of services. The series of demonstrations that shook the 
Rousseff government in 2013 had a strong anti-inflation component 
shared by both the middle and working classes.
During the devastating economic crisis of 2015, 3.7 million people 
were displaced from Class C and entered the ranks of the new poor 
(Singer 2018a: 30). Today, the wealthier classes A and B – 33 per cent 
of Brazil’s population – account for 60 per cent of spending growth 
in Brazil, while Class C accounts for only 33 per cent (Pearson 2015). 
In his first term, while pushing pro-labour policies, Lula continued to 
appease the financial community by keeping interest rates among the 
highest in the world (Braga and Purdy 2018)11 and massively appre-
ciating12 the real, which increased industrial unemployment and 
boosted mass consumption among the poorer classes also facilitated 
by new forms of cheap credit (crédito consignado). Because of Lula’s 
early pro-labour policies, the social state spending rose to 23 per cent 
of the GDP, which led him to cut welfare expenses and deregulate the 
labour market in his second term. From 2003 to 2005, the minimum 
salary grew by 6.8 per cent but by only 1.5 per cent from 2015 to 
2016 (Carvalho 2018: 20). Moreover, about 94 per cent of the jobs 
created during the Lula and Rousseff administrations are low income 
(below 1.5 minimum wages) and concentrated in nonindustrial sec-
tors such as retail, construction work, transport and general service 
(Pochmann 2012); 60 per cent of these involve young people (18–24 
years old), mainly women and ethnic minorities. In 2012, low-income 
and casualised labour and informal and unremunerated work made 
up 55 per cent of the labour market.
The sociologist Ruy Braga (2016) describes lulismo in terms of a 
‘schizophrenic’ dualism between policies that formalised employ-
ment and decreased occupational precariousness for informal work-
ers and the lumpen on the one hand, and policies that increased the 
flexibilisation and precarisation of formal labour on the other hand. 
The precarisation of wage labour had a deleterious impact on the 
traditional working-class occupations, as demonstrated by the expo-
nential rise of turnover rates and industrial accidents in traditional 
industries.13 In terms of party structure, Lula put an end to the PT’s 
consensus-based and horizontal structure, centralising it, bureaucra-
tising it and excluding the grassroots movements that propelled it to 
power, especially the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra 
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(Landless Workers’ Movement – MST) (Wainwright and Branford 
2006) and transformed the trade union movement into a ‘bourgeois 
state formation’ (Braga 2016: 70) involved in  private-public partner-
ships, pension fund management and corporate banking. Moreover, 
lulismo involved a specific discoursive shift. In his first term, Lula 
addressed his people (povo) as ‘working class’. In his second term, 
he took the distance from his image of working-class leader and 
presented himself as a champion of the poor. Thus, discoursively, 
he turned the class conflict between left and right (the PT’s tradi-
tional focus) into a conflict between poor and rich mediated through 
his personal charisma. Lula’s transformation into a populist leader 
alienated the base of the PT, which traditionally opposed  populism 
(Singer 2012).
Yet, in a country where the formal working class constitutes a small 
minority within a much broader dispossessed population, populism 
does not imply the veering away from class issues. Instead, it may 
mark the emergence of a new form of class articulation that extends 
to the more marginal constituencies (Singer 2018a: 20). In this sense, 
the historical legacy of Brazilian populism reflects the entanglement 
between industrial development and backwardness. Indeed, against 
the common claim that the Brazilian political system is extremely 
fragmented (Mainwaring 2018), Singer (2018a: 23) argues that at least 
since Vargas’s Estado Novo, Brazilian politics has been characterised 
by a clear-cut bipartisanism between a conservative party represent-
ing a small middle-class elite and a liberal party representing Brazil’s 
vast rural and urban underclass with a clientelist party of the rural 
elites acting as mediator. In the past forty years, such polarisation 
was between the PSDB and the socialist PT mediated by the clien-
telist centre-right party Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (Brazilian 
Democratic Movement – MDB). By incorporating the MDB inside his 
governmental coalition and luring the financial class, Lula depolar-
ised his administration and stepped into the electoral ground of the 
‘the party of the rich’.
Starting from his personal trajectory – a poor nordestino (north-
easterner) and ex-metalworker who became Brazil’s president – Lula 
perfectly incarnated such polarisation between wealth and poverty, 
as well as the contradictions and limitations of any attempt to go 
beyond it. At the time of my fieldwork, inequality was decreasing 
nationally, and labour incomes were converging towards a median 
just above the poverty line. But such convergence hid a deep political 
instability. The upwardly mobile poor overwhelmingly supported the 
government, whereas the downwardly mobile casualised working 
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class I describe in this book, and the impoverished precarious public 
workers (lecturers, bankers) and service workers (teleworkers) – the 
lower Class C – strongly opposed it.
In chapter 2, I show the wageworkers of CSN were largely disaf-
fected with lulismo because they were badly hit by the labour deregu-
lation and wage decline during the PT’s second administration. A big 
portion of line leaders, operative workers and the affluent mineiros14 
of the operative departments, considered themselves Class C, had an 
individualistic and middle-class mentality that prioritised lifestyle 
over occupational identity and were strongly critical of the PT’s turn-
around from being a working-class party to being aligned with the 
financial elites. Among them, second-generation workers – now close 
to retirement – had supported Cardoso over Lula in the 1990s and 
were now affiliated with the conservative MDB and the Força Sindical 
(Union Force – FS) trade union confederation. These disaffected 
metalúrgicos had developed an anti-lulista stance and voted Bolsonaro 
against Fernando Haddad in the 2018 elections. Surprisingly, the 
leadership of the Metalworkers’ Union supported Bolsonaro, too.
A second group of employees, consisting mostly of unskilled work-
ers, identified with the populist tradition of the Partido Democrático 
Trabalhista (Democratic Labour Party – PDT), the working-class 
party funded by Leonel Brizola, to revive the legacy of Vargas’s 
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party) particularly, 
its workerist, developmental and corporatist vision. Some skilled 
engineers and operatives identified with this vision, too, which they 
felt constituted the real core of the PT and which was endorsed more 
forcibly by Rousseff and Minister of Finance Guido Mantega after 
2010. Third, younger workers who entered the company under the 
current ‘authoritarian’ regime were more politically militant against 
the company and the government and affiliated with the radical 
Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (Socialism and Liberty Party – PSOL), 
which was gaining support among precarised wageworkers, includ-
ing university and schoolteachers, IT, service and retail workers. In 
2005, disaffected with the PT’s first term in power, the PSOL and 
the Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party) broke 
away from the PT (Wainwright and Branford 2006).
The only working-class constituencies that supported the PT were 
the cleaners, informal workers and builders I describe in chapter 
6 who, coming from extremely poor backgrounds, benefited from 
Lula’s Bolsa Família and the regulation of outsourced labour pushed 
by the PT in the 2000s. It helped that the PT in Volta Redonda was 
represented by Cida Diogo, a charismatic general practitioner who 
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led important environmental struggles against CSN in poor neigh-
bourhoods for more than thirty years. Many top CSN managers 
supported Lula, too, for his imperialist expansion in Latin America, 
the militarisation of the national soil against foreign investors and the 
financialisation of the steel industry through the BNDES.
These diverse attitudes towards Lula – the metalúrgicos and middle 
managers criticising him, and precarious workers and top manag-
ers supporting him – reflected the broader economic scenario. CSN 
was losing money as a steelmaker – its losses were offset by profits 
in the mining division in Congonhas (Minas Gerais) and by finan-
cial returns– and cutting down investments and personnel in Volta 
Redonda. In parallel to the trajectory of deindustrialisation, new jobs 
were being created every day in the shopping centres, retail shops, 
private medical clinics, IT centres and call centres spreading all over 
steel city. These jobs were extremely precarious and short term, 
especially after President Michel Temer introduced the new ‘interim’ 
contract of employment in 2017. Paradoxically, the booming service 
and leisure industries were being fed with the household debts of the 
steelworkers. For sometimes it seemed precarious service workers 
had become affluent Class C, too. Endorsing the middle-class lifestyle 
of the metalworkers, they bought heavily subsidised cars, televisions 
and even homes.
Towards the end of my fieldwork, when the first signs of the col-
lapse of the commodity boom emerged and CSN dismissed workers 
en masse, cleaners, tertiarised workers and residents of poor bairros 
were hit so hard by spiralling household debts, house repossessions 
and unemployment that they finally turned against the PT and 
the Metalworkers’ Union, too. This is when the hegemony of the 
PT finally collapsed. At the national level, such re-articulation of 
impoverished lumpen and casualised and precarised wageworkers 
led to the extraordinary resurgence of working-class militancy in 
2013, which combined ‘the political struggles of the urban precariat in 
defence of their social right, and the economic struggles of the formal 
working class for better working conditions and salaries’ (Braga 2016: 
63; Mollona 2018a). In Volta Redonda, it was the most impoverished 
section of the working class – women cleaners, garbage collectors and 
tertiarised service workers – that led this struggle.
In chapter 3, I show the spatial dimension of class struggles in the 
context of the broader dynamics of financialisation and decentralisa-
tion of the economy started with democratic constitution in 1988, when 
municipalities became both indebted economic subjects and autono-
mous political subjects. The class struggles of the 1980s combined 
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factory and urban activism around the ‘land issue’. In the 1990s, these 
struggles polarised in the particularistic factory-based actions of the 
metalworkers on the one hand, and the Right to the City movement 
of the Volta Redonda municipality and marginal constituencies on 
the other. When the financialisation of the Brazilian economy hit the 
ground in Volta Redonda (from the 2000s onwards), the focus of class 
struggle shifted from the factory and the city into the regionalist eco-
nomic and environmental platforms involving municipalities, trade 
unions, regional businesses, wealthy  landowners, global carmakers 
and the metalúrgicos. In this context, the Sul Fluminense regional 
alliance acted both as a powerful anti-systemic force against the São 
Paulo region controlled by the ruling PT and as a new global capital-
ist network.
In chapter 4, I show how the Metalworkers’ Union embodied 
the multifaceted dimension and deep contradictions of lulismo. 
Politically, most CSN workers and Metalworkers’ Union leaders con-
sidered themselves ‘more left-wing’ than the ruling PT and openly 
criticised Lula for endorsing neo-liberalism. Yet, the union endorsed 
financial capitalism, too, operating like a financial and legal service 
provider while also being involved in social unionism and local activ-
ism. Subscribing to Lula’s ideology of people’s capitalism, the central 
branch of the Metalworkers’ Union functioned as a transmission belt 
of national policies of democratisation of credit and financialisation 
of working-class households typically, through MCMV. Moreover, 
reflecting the depolarisation of class struggle taking place within 
the governmental coalition, the SMSF incorporated the centrist and 
populist PDT, MDB and FS inside its leadership and cut links with 
grassroots urban movements (neighbourhood associations, women’s 
organisations, the MST) and with the precarised automotive, civic 
construction, service and informal sectors workers. In discoursive 
terms, trade union leaders followed lulismo in ‘moralising capitalism’ 
using the same workerist Christian language Lula inherited from his 
early Catholic militancy.
In chapter 5, I show how a large portion of CSN workers, 
especially those who did not belong to the aristocracy of labour, 
endorsed Cardoso’s and Lula’s vision of ‘stock market capitalism’ 
as an instrument of democratisation of the economy and bought 
stocks of the company, private pensions and bonds, thinking of 
themselves as capitalists rather than workers. On the other hand, 
those CSN employees who opposed privatisation and worker-led 
financial capitalism retreated into an increasingly productivist, 
sectionalist and  factory-based stance. Throughout this book, I will 
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explore these multiple dimensions of the working-class experience 
and  fragmentation – between lulismo and anti-lulismo; anti-capitalism 
and imperialism; neighbourhood-based and factory activism; pro-
ductive and speculative class identities and between nationalism and 
regionalism.
Fieldwork
The idea of doing fieldwork in Volta Redonda came while dis-
cussing my Sheffield research with a Brazilian colleague. We were 
both intrigued by the comparison between the two steel towns. 
Deindustrialisation in Sheffield had been so radical because Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s programme of privatisation and indus-
trial closures was meant to destroy the British working class, which 
the English bourgeoisie always held in great contempt, also because 
of its Darwinian view of the market economy as a healthy process of 
destruction of weaker forms (i.e. in its view, labour) and survival of 
stronger ones (i.e. capital). During my fieldwork in Sheffield, main-
stream media and MPs described the ongoing closures of the steel 
plants with a fitting botanical metaphor – as a process of pruning of 
dead brunches and of mutilation for the purpose of social and eco-
nomic regeneration aimed at developing a healthier post-industrial 
landscape.
My hypothesis was that Brazil lacked such extreme market and 
anti-labour ideologies because of the country’s strong tradition 
of developmentalism and trabalhismo, as well as its already over-
extended labour reserve army, which could not be stretched fur-
ther without breaking the system. Besides, because of the structural 
entanglement between finance, industry and landownership, Brazil’s 
transition into post-Fordism was highly unlikely. But my comparison 
was not intended to highlight the differences between post-Fordism 
in the core and developmentalism in the periphery. Instead, I wanted 
to understand their articulations in space and time. As the world’s 
capital of finance, the United Kingdom could afford to close down its 
less profitable and more polluting industries and buying commod-
ities and semi-manufactured goods on the world market, whereas 
Brazil is stuck in its historical role of exporter of raw material and 
primary and semi-finished goods and as provider of cheap labour 
and land to foreign multinationals localised in the country.
Indeed, Brazil’s relationship with dependent development vis-à-vis 
Britain started in 1808, when the British Navy escorted Prince Regent 
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João from Lisbon to Bahia, helping the Portuguese royal family to 
establish its court in the tropics, and continued through British con-
trol of the Brazilian cotton trade in early nineteenth century, the coffee 
and iron industries in the twentieth century, the national electricity 
infrastructure in the 1940s and through various forms of direct and 
indirect investments today. Besides, British Protestantism and the 
Victorian bourgeois values of self-interest and individualism were 
central in the ‘re-Europeanisation’ of Brazil during the Old Republic 
(J. Souza 2017: 62). On the other hand, Sheffield and Volta Redonda 
can also be considered two similar ‘world peripheries’ where industry 
always remained subordinated to the interests of landed and finan-
cial elites. Indeed, after the global economic crisis of 2008, Sheffield 
was more of a world periphery than Volta Redonda – a forgotten 
land, abandoned by both finance and industry.
In 2008, when I arrived in Brazil, it seemed Lula’s ‘social- 
developmental’ formula (Bresser Pereira 2017; Singer 2015, 2018a) – 
re- nationalisation of industries, controlled financialisation and social 
redistribution – constituted a tangible alternative to the deregu-
lated capitalism in the Global North, which appeared to be on the 
verge of collapsing. Barack Obama’s election to the US presidency, 
which I witnessed together with jubilant Brazilian colleagues at the 
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro), reinforced the impression that a new, post-neo-liberal order 
was emerging. The consolidation of the so-called pink tide in Latin 
America seemed to suggest this new global order had its epicentre in 
the Global South.
In Volta Redonda, I lived in bairro 60, a historical working-class 
bairro funded by CSN in 1946. My house was in road 60/2, border-
ing the vast Cicuta Forest and surrounded by lush hills where local 
residents hiding from CSN private police cultivated subsistence food 
(tomato, maize, courgettes, farofa) that made up a substantial part 
of their daily diet. This particular stretch of the road was poorer 
than the rest of the bairro and was inhabited for most of the day 
by children and women, while men nomadically travelled to and 
from their jobs. I hoped I could do in-depth ethnographic research 
inside the plant and even work there as I did in Sheffield. I hoped 
that in the tradition of the Italian operaist working-class enquiries, I 
could look at the relations between capital and labour at the point of 
production (Burawoy 1985). But, upon insistence of the management, 
my research inside the plant was initially limited to qualitative inter-
views with employees and managers twice a week, eight hours per 
day, mainly in the firm’s productive departments. Towards the end of 
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the fieldwork, I spent more time in informal conversations with the 
workers in the canteens, offices and break rooms.
During the rest of the week, I interviewed social activists, repre-
sentatives from metalworkers’ unions, cleaners and civic construction 
workers, community leaders, priests activists, labour lawyers, labour 
Figure 0.3. The City Centre (© Massimiliano Mollona).
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judges, council workers, teachers and leaders of bairros and resi-
dents associations. Subsequently, as my informants became friends, 
I was actively involved in legal campaigns, pamphleting and direct 
activism. Besides, I occasionally lectured in primary and secondary 
schools in poor bairros and favelas and organised weekly meetings 
with workers during which we discussed books, poetry and newspa-
pers articles. I also met workers at the swimming pool of the workers’ 
club, at Samba nights and at feijoadas (a traditional stew of beans and 
pork) at my friends’ homes on Sundays.
Ten months into my fieldwork, I inexplicably started receiving 
death threats. In the following months, my mobility was severely 
restricted. In December 2009, a year into my fieldwork, following 
the advice of Brazilian friends and colleagues, I left Volta Redonda. 
When I left Brazil, the economy was booming. President Lula had just 
finished his mandate with an 83 per cent approval rating – the highest 
in Brazilian political history (Marinho 2010). Yet, the political crisis 
of lulismo had been tangible throughout my fieldwork. During my 
subsequent visits to Volta Redonda in 2011 and 2012, I experienced 
the slow onset of the economic crisis, as CSN started to restructure 
and lay-off people and unemployment grew across all sectors. But I 
could not imagine the scale of the crash in 2015 when the economy 
shrunk by 3.8 per cent; unemployment rose to 9.5 per cent (38 per 
cent up from the previous year), wiping out three million jobs from 
the labour market; and informal labour peaked from 40 per cent 
to 51 per cent. Neither could I fathom the coup against Rousseff in 
2016, the jailing of Lula just before the start of the 2018 presidential 
elections and the election of Bolsonaro to the presidency.
My last visit to Volta Redonda took place in November 2018 on 
the day Bolsonaro won. During the visit, I was deeply troubled by 
the extent of the political and economic crisis in Volta Redonda. For 
instance, back in 2008, my fifty-five-year-old friend Gerardo; his wife, 
Lara; and their son, Cassio, led a comfortable lifestyle – which included 
two cars, Cassio’s expensive motocross hobby, Gerardo’s regular fish-
ing trips to Mato Grosso and Lara’s weekly physiotherapies – out of 
the pension he received from CSN, while Cassio apprenticed for a 
subcontractor of CSN and his fiancée, Jane, worked at a homeopathy 
clinic. In 2018, they had moved out of Volta Redonda (which had 
become too expensive) to the ‘dormitory town’15 of Pinheiral. Cassio 
had been unemployed for three years and had married Jane, who 
quit her job because of the high costs of commuting. The family 
now lived off the extra income generated by renting out the flat in 
Volta Redonda and off Gerardo’s pension. Unsurprisingly, the whole 
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family had shifted its political support from the PT to Bolsonaro in 
the 2018 presidential election.
Now under a conservative leadership, the Metalworkers’ Union 
had supported Bolsonaro, too. Some of the historical leadership of 
social movements kept on struggling. For instance, Zezinho, the 
leader of the Movimento Ética na Política – Volta Redonda (Movement 
for Ethics in Politics – Volta Redonda) and of the Pastoral Operária 
(Workers’ Pastoral) continued to organise weekly meetings in poor 
communities and to campaign against CSN on issues of employment, 
working conditions, industrial accidents and environmental pollution 
both in his parish and through his community radio. Beth, the leader 
of the women’s movement, continued to raise consciousness among 
young women of poor bairros and to campaign against domestic 
violence; Renata, a nurse in the city council, kept on working on 
empowering young black women; Lincoln, the militant president of 
the planning department and a PT councillor in the 1990s, continued 
to be actively involved in legal proceedings against CSN’s ownership 
of 25 per cent of urban land.
University lecturers continued to lead militant research on human 
rights, working conditions and labour activism against CSN and 
schoolteachers in poor bairros continued to use Paulo Freire’s ped-
agogy despite its criminalisation under the new proposed Escola 
sem Partido (Nonpartisan School) legal framework.16 A week after 
Bolsonaro became president, I took part in the event ‘Thirty Years 
after the 1988 Strike’ organised by the Department of Anthropology 
and Sociology of the Universidade Federal Fluminense (Federal 
Fluminense University). In the introductory speech in the packed 
lecture theatre, one of the lecturers said: ‘We must remember the 
strike of 1988 not as we remember objects that end up in muse-
ums. We must take the memory of the strike with us every day and 
use it to understand what is happening in the present. In the light 
of the recent political election, this active sense of history is all the 
more important.’ Given the heavy censorship that was falling upon 
Brazilian universities around the time of the elections, the lecturer’s 
combative speech and lucid sense of history touched me.
Ten years earlier, in 2008, I had taken part in the twentieth com-
memoration of the strike, in a theatre in the Volta Redonda city 
centre. Back then, Brazil’s economy and lulismo were riding high. But 
the mood of the commemoration was subdued and melancholic, as if 
the object of commemoration indeed pertained to a forever lost past. 
Why was the mood so combative and positive today? It has been 
argued that the military coup of 1964 was a reaction of the Brazilian 
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bourgeoisie to the rise of labour strikes and activism that followed 
the formation of the ligas camponesas (peasant leagues) in 1961 and the 
Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Command of Workers) 
in 1962, and that the ‘new trade unionism’ of the 1980s was a form of 
labour re-articulation against the military-industrial complex solidi-
fied during dictatorship. Likewise, bolsonarismo arguably marked the 
resurgence of such military-industrial complex in response to the 
labour conquests achieved (for better or for worse) under the PT 
administration.
Can it be that the new combative spirit I witnessed in Volta 
Redonda reflected the beginning of yet another  working-class artic-
ulation? Can it be that labour is already organising itself, already 
coalescing around a new form after its violent crushing by capital? 
These broader questions opened up at the end of my fieldwork. 
Indeed, how does one relate the experience of fieldwork to the struc-
tural articulation of capitalism in space and time? With what tempo-
ral delay do global and national political and economic events (crises, 
coups, inflation hikes, electoral successes and radical privatisations) 
impact everyday life, and in turn, what is the cumulative effect of 
local actions on the broader context? What can one’s fieldwork say or 
do about capitalism, the relationships between core and peripheries 
and the future of labour struggles?
Was the political and economic crisis I observed in Volta Redonda 
in 2009 the consequence of the global financial crisis of 2008? Or 
was it a local process of deindustrialisation triggered by regional 
extractivist forces? Or was I observing yet a different process – 
namely, the political crisis of lulismo? And was this a national trend? 
Or was it part of the regional crisis of the pink tide? Or of the global 
collapse of ‘progressive neoliberalism’? (Brenner and Fraser 2017). 
Doing fieldwork involves juggling several different dimensions – 
seeing behind the visual evidence, thinking across different temporal 
and geographical scales and continuously testing and reifying one’s 
theory, in my case Marxism, vis-à-vis the complex social and political 
entanglements of everyday life. For instance, it was easy to dismiss 
the anti-Lula talks of the Metalworkers’ Union directors as mere rhe-
torical exercises of a bourgeoisified section of the working class that 
was itself a state agent. But missing from that judgement were the 
invisible tensions between national and local union branches, between 
the Metalworkers’ Union and the CUT confederation, between social 
movements and the PT and between Metalworkers’ Union’s active 
role in factory negotiations and its corporatist  dependence upon the 
state.
"BRAZILIAN STEEL TOWN: Machines, Land, Money and Commoning in the Making of the Working Class" by 
 Massimiliano Mollona. https://berghahnbooks.com/title/MollonaBrazilian
Introduction   |   29
Likewise, from a cursory glance at CSN and considering its dra-
matic visual impact on the surrounding city, it was easy enough to 
describe the firm as an obsolete and polluting steelmaker and Volta 
Redonda as a typical ‘rust-belt city’. But such observation missed 
the vast and invisible economic ramifications of CSN in the city – its 
army of subcontractors, tertiarised workers and suppliers – and its 
national and international linkages, interdependencies and cross- 
participations across mining, logistics, finance, infrastructure and 
construction that make Volta Redonda both a traditional industrial 
steel town and a global financial and logistical hub. Moreover, beyond 
the ‘evident’ environmental and cultural differences – the lush nature 
surrounding the plant, the mellow vibe of political demonstrations or 
the dilapidated architecture of poor bairros – is the working class of 
Volta Redonda not the same as the working class in Sheffield, with its 
everyday struggles, precarious existence and enduring solidarities?
Doing fieldwork through a political economy framework entails 
a constant suspension of belief and of sensory experience, in the 
light of what happened ‘before’ and ‘elsewhere’ and for reorienting 
our actions and social relations in the present. In such combination 
of physical and analytical displacement, relational openness and 
self-discovery fieldwork, more than a methodology, is a political 
praxis. Unlike in Sheffield, where my fieldwork was immersive and 
I managed to ‘blend in’, I was always perceived, for better or worse, 
as a foreign researcher in Volta Redonda, perhaps also because of the 
defensive posture of the Brazilian working class at the time. I also 
struggled to get used to the claustrophobic atmosphere of the city 
and to the tentacular extensions of the plant – the fumes, the noises, 
the CCTV cameras and the private police – which seemed to follow 
me everywhere.
Yet, I was slowly captured by and immersed in the magical and 
surreal experience of living in the Brazilian steel town, walking and 
cycling in the shadow of the gigantic silhouette of the UPV, playing 
football by the carcinogenic mountains of coal dust, breathing ben-
zene while jogging across misty yellow smokes, fishing diseased fish, 
shopping for groceries amidst loud furnace explosions and watchful 
CCTV cameras and drinking coffee in homes with no roofs, electric-
ity or sanitation. It is this resilience of the families of Volta Redonda 
that my ethnography seeks to interrogate and to celebrate as a way to 
explore the condition of the working class in the twenty-first century. 
In Volta Redonda, I became absorbed in the reading of Brazil: Land 
of the Future, written by the Jewish Viennese poet and writer Stefan 
Zweig (1941) and published in Brazil the year of CSN’s founding.
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In the book, Zweig describes Brazil and Europe as being at the 
opposite ends of time and history. With its concern with history, 
tradition and authenticity, Europe is stuck in the past. In Brazil there 
is no history, origin or tradition – only an ‘ongoing transformation 
of everything’. Transformation is so ubiquitous that there is no stan-
dard time, and ‘hours have more minutes than in Europe’ (1941: 
57). The future constantly leaks into the present. Moreover, unlike 
European and American capitalism, which create ‘dark, homoge-
nous and unnumbered masses’ and where the cultural and political 
homogenisation of the working class generates class conflict, the 
Brazilian working class is fluid, colourful and heterogeneous – ‘it 
expands outside the factories to include the caboclos of the Amazon, 
the seringueiros in the forest, the raqueiros in the plains and the indios 
in the impenetrable jungle’ (133).
Zweig and Vargas met several times during Zweig’s stay in Brazil. 
From their diaries, we know they liked each other, for they both 
considered the Estado Novo the future of decaying Europe. Vargas 
was particularly obsessed by the spectre of European communism 
and Zweig by that of Nazism. Their shared vision reveals the entan-
glement between industrial modernity in the Global South and the 
crisis and revival of the European project, played out in the phantas-
matic space where exilic intellectuals, authoritarian dictators and the 
spectres/fetishes of the communist proletariat meet. With the growth 
of National Socialism, Zweig left Austria in the 1930s and, after a 
long stay in England in 1940, settled down in Petrópolis (not far from 
Volta Redonda), where Pedro II had established the royal court in 
the nineteenth century. In Petrópolis, Zweig (1943) wrote The World 
of Yesterday, an emotional memoir of the collapse of the Hapsburg 
Empire and of Mitteleuropa, with its cosmopolitan intellectuals, open 
cafe culture and international solidarities, because of the ascent of 
Nazism and the prospect of the Second World War. In Petrópolis, 
haunted by depression, Zweig committed suicide with his second 
wife, Lotte Altmann, in 1942.
As my fieldwork proceeded, I was struck by how Zweig ‘s exilic 
life resonated with my own experience. I too had abandoned old 
Europe at a moment of deep economic and political crisis, which 
in Italy had triggered violent right-wing movements, the ascent to 
power of Berlusconi and the multiplication of Mafia terrorist attacks 
on civilians. I too had moved first to the United Kingdom, lured by 
the hopes generated by the New Labour party of Tony Blair, and then 
to Brazil, following the trail of the ‘new’ Latin American socialism, 
embodied in the charismatic figure of Lula da Silva – whom several 
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of my interlocutors called ‘the new Vargas’. Like Zweig, I too was 
hunted down and exhausted from chasing a future that never mate-
rialised and from the disappointment and depression generated by 
these crushed hopes. But as my fieldwork unfolded, I appreciated 
that the melancholic exilic space I was experiencing was not neutral. 
Instead, in it, my feelings and expectations for Brazil were partially 
implicated with a neocolonial gaze projecting Western ways of think-
ing and feeling onto the South. Aware of the affective drives and 
contradictory positionality in which it was produced, Brazilian Steel 
Town is also a silent reflection on my own past and on my hopes for 
the future.
Notes
 1. Despite the changes introduced under the Temer administration in 2017.
 2. Viana (1955: 58) argues Vargas’s workerist legislation led to a peaceful social revolution 
by offering three types of inclusions: within the firm, through the promise of stable 
employment; within the state, through compulsory union participation and corporatist 
decision-making structures; and within the social welfare.
 3. The sociologist Ching Kwan Lee (2007: 12) makes a similar case in her analysis of 
labour protest in contemporary China.
 4. For a discussion of the performance of military-trained managers in Brazil, see 
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014: 133–140).
 5. In 2017, the construction firm was at the centre of a major corruption scandal which 
led to the impeachment of both Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and of Peruvian 
President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and reverberated throughout Latin America
 6. ‘A committee of the federal senate in Brazil approved a Constitutional Amendment 
Proposal (PEC 65/2012) stating that no project should be suspected or cancelled once 
an [Environmental Impact Assessment] has been submitted. The proposal has been 
returned to the committee, but it could be released for a vote of the full senate at any 
time’ (Ritter et al. 2017: 165). If approved, major infrastructure projects will be able 
to proceed regardless of their impacts on biodiversity, indigenous areas, traditional 
communities and conservation areas (Rocha 2016).
 7. While the minimum wages at the low-end of the occupational scale (up to five min-
imum wages) had doubled during the Lula administration, theirs barely kept above 
inflation levels.
 8. The minimum wage rose by 23 per cent during the first Lula administration. Rising 
wages accounted for 60 per cent of the fall in the Gini coefficient from 2001 to 2011. 
According to the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA 2012), the Gini coef-
ficient fell to 0.527 in 2011 from 0.595 in 2001. From 2001 to 2011, the income of the 
poorest 10 per cent of the population grew by 91 per cent, while that of the richest 10 
per cent by just 16.6 per cent.
 9. In Brazil, social classes are marked by letters and based on the household’s gross 
monthly income. For instance, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografica e Estatística 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) defines Class A as above R$15,760; 
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Class B, R$7,880; Class C, R$3,152; Class D, R$1,576; and Class E as below R$1,576 
(Fujikawa Nes 2016). The relationship between income and classes is also represented 
in terms of the national minimum salary, which is currently R$998 per month (as of 
April 2019).
10. Occupationally, Class A is composed of bankers, investors, business owners, major 
landowners, etc.; Class C, people who provide services directly to the wealthier groups 
(teachers, managers, mechanics, electricians, nurses); Class D, people who provide 
services to Class C (housemaids, bartenders, bricklayers, civil construction workers, 
small store owners, low-paid drivers); Class E, people who earn minimum salaries 
(cleaners, street sweepers, unemployed people).
11. Almost half the revenue was used to pay off national debt, and Brazil’s four-largest 
banks earned profits in 2013 that surpassed the GDP of eighty-three countries.
12. R$3.95 to $1 in December 2005; R$1.65 in December 2010 (Bresser-Pereira 2017: 312).
13. Braga (2016: 75) estimates the rate of tertiarisation of labour increased by 13 per cent 
per year from 1996 to 2010. In 2013, 12.7 million workers were tertiarised.
14. This appellate specifically refers to workers with provenience from the state of Minas 
Gerais.
15. The residents consist mainly of retired CSN employees who were laid off in the 1990s.
16. If passed, the law will illegalise discussing ‘political subjects’ in primary schools and 
universities.
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